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THE MAKING OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS
We won’t repair the world (...) 
until we've removedfrom 
school textbooks the grains 
o f untruth and hatred
Tadeusz Nowakowski, 
The Camp o f Ali Saints (1990)
The Problem
The ąuestion contained in the title of this paper, a question essentially referring to 
the scope of a person’s freedom within his own group relationships and his authen- 
tic opportunity to choose his own identity, is at least as old as the concept of natio- 
nal awareness itself. Both these matters -  at least in Europę -  date back to the first 
half of the 19lh century and are closely linked to one another. This is because natio- 
nal awareness -  “selected history and the group of symbols connected with it” 
(Deutch 1953: 389) -  is not borne of simple primary extrapolation of ethnic aware­
ness, arising spontaneously, but -  on the contrary -  it is a thing which must be cre- 
ated by intellectuals and institutions. It is not enough, for this purpose -  to bring 
about the emergence of a separate nation. The very naturę of this process was fi- 
nely expressed by Massimo d ’Azeglio in his famous declaration in the mid-19th 
century: “Abbiamo fatto 1’Italia, adesso dobbiamo fare Italiani” (Latham 1970). 
Similar thoughts are expressed by phrases such as “transformation of the peasants 
into the French” or, in Polish, “nationalising the peasant”.
However, when conscious steps are taken towards creating feelings of gro­
up relationships, which do not stem from the everyday experience of individuals -  
in this case awareness of being a nation -  manipulations creep in: we see the 
muffling of certain constitute aspects of tradition, the stimulating of memories abo­
ut other aspects, and even the constructing of ideological visions which stand in
stark contrast to the facts. In order to ensure that a similar awareness integrates 
a group of many, it is first necessary to stimulate the group with awareness. It is 
necessary to evoke the kind of frame of mind, in which individuals will start per- 
ceiving themselves in national categories. The state, intellectuals and journalists 
bring pressure to bear, as a result of which we “become aware”, we discover in 
ourselves -  as the Romantics claim -  our nationality or, in keeping with Enligh- 
tenment concepts, we become the hostages of stereotype imaginations, standardi- 
sed opinions, views and beliefs imposed on us by school, symbolic culture and, 
often, professions of faith. We rarely verify the above, though the conviction about 
the need to constantly reflect on the significance of awareness -  “re-educating the 
human kind” (Kennedy 1992) has a long history. This phenomenon springs to life 
at times of great civilizational tuming points (group millennium fears, the fali of 
empires and the decline of global Weltanschauung) when it is not enough to simply 
“believe in the faith” which hitherto seemed to be obvious “in itself and when the 
anxious question “why?” arises. And what more -  without freeing oneself from 
a considerable part of hitherto axioms -  internal order of individuals and groups of 
people, as well as any reasonable system of relationships between these groupings, 
is not possible. Furthermore, what in national awareness and feeling of identity is 
extemal in relation to the individual and at the same time imposed? And what 
stems from choice and self-reflection? What, to use a term taken from structural 
linguistics, is of an invariant character, and what might and ought to be reviewed or 
changed, amongst others, as a result of individual reflection?
The Theoretical Perspective
Two intellectual traditions seem to be crucial in solving the above dilemma. The 
first, syntonic with Kantian understanding of self-determination, expounds the 
subjectivity of the human individual. It claims that only disposition, “identical in 
all people”, is truły sovereign. It is this disposition, not experience, which is 
universal and -  at the same time -  necessary. The principles, which guide people 
(particularly in scientific cognisance and morał knowledge), are not in relation to 
them extemal. We ourselves are responsible for them. For this reason “our identity 
and dignity stem from our human naturę, from our rationality and not from the 
culture to which we belong” (Gellner 1991: 158). The division of humanity into 
nations “ is secondary and does not result in any way from natural causes” (Żelazny 
1992: 7). The second tradition (multi-threaded, in a sense also Hegelian), on the 
contrary, attributes the deciding role to the group and to anthropologically under- 
stood culture, in other words, to factors and influences beyond the individual: de- 
prived of universality, spontaneity and rigid structure.
From the outside a steered individual “belongs” to a “kind”, a patrimony 
(one’s native land, inheritance), he makes use of, and at the same time depends on, 
institutions and political organisations, he exchanges symbols in the communica- 
tion system binding in the group.
National awareness and identity, in the contemporary sense of the word, is 
linked to a larger degree to the second of the two above-mentioned traditions. The 
conviction concerning the need for constant inspection of attached meanings and 
the manner in which they are handed down from one generation to the next, con- 
cerns the first tradition.
I agree with Ernest Barker (1933: 219) that “national identity is a creation 
of the 19Ih century”, and that its emergence is connected with not only ideological 
changes in Europę brought about by the French Revolution, but also with consoli- 
dation of Capitalist formation. Theoretical concepts (such as those of Hegel, Fichte 
and Mazzini) carried weight, as well as practical measures (e.g. Cavour, Garibaldi, 
Palacky and Masaryk). Ali of this, however, does not mean that national awareness 
was formulated in a historical vacuum. On the contrary, as a rule it is “super- 
structured” to previously existing forms of ethnic awareness i.e. “simplified and 
not overly articulated feelings of spontaneity (...) existing within social mentality” 
(Wiatr 1973: 390). However -  as this fact was proven so convincingly by Emme- 
rich K. Francis (1976) and Benedykt Zientara (1985) -  not every ethnic awareness 
had the same chance and not everywhere was developed national awareness prece- 
ded by ethnic awareness. This certainly was not so in the case of 46 Western- 
European language minorities analyzed by Erik Allardt (1979), as well as in the 
United States of America (Kubiak, Kusielewicz, Gromada 1988). There can be no 
doubt that those culture groups, which were able previously to create a state orga- 
nisation or take control of the state and force on others the course of integration 
and centralisation processes according to their own models, had the greatest 
opportunities.
Residual senses of ethnic awareness, coming to light as a result of routine 
participation in group activity (binding models of satisfying needs, institutions, the 
language of day to day communication, similar historical experiences within the 
framework of a strictly defrned habitat, the pressure of norms and religious organi- 
sations, customs, habits and symbolical culture) are, in turn, purposefully standar- 
dised and -  freąuently -  rationalised, whilst valued through radically polarised 
emotions. Ethnic awarenesses become national awareness. In turn, it is through 
national awareness that individuals and primary groups (including regional ones) 
are linked into secondary groups (including nation states), and become acąuainted 
with those aspects of political organisation, culture and ideology, which do not 
stem from their direct existential experience. To these, amongst others, belong -  
often regarded as the dijferentia specifica of national awareness -  “state feeling” 
(the need for “one’s own political roof and political attendance”, Gellner 1991: 62) 
and “clearly articulated national ideologies” (Wiatr 1973: 390).
Feelings of national identity are often treated as the aspiration of the human 
individual to control his own life and to self-determination (“... to realise his or her 
right to self-determination”, Dov Ronen 1979: 52). This same need, says Ronen, is
-  in certain circumstances -  satiated through a deep experience of class and/or race 
identity, as well as religious identification and a feeling of identity with a minority. 
In each of these cases individuals and smali groups perceive themselves against the
backdrop of larger groups of reference. This takes place because “it is impossible 
to provide a coherent account of the self in isolation from some wider social group” 
(Mayall 1990: 48).
If one accepts this point of view it is impossible not to notice that a certain 
problem arises when considering feelings of national identity. Even though it is 
possible in the contemporary world not to perceive oneself in categories of class, 
race or religion (at least in many countries) -  as well as in terms of a minority -  it 
is still regarded as abnormal not to hołd one’s clearly delineated nationality (often 
equated with belonging to a State). A person without a nation is a person without 
a shadow: “A person without his own nation abuses commonly accepted categories 
and exposes himself to public opinion” (Gellner 1991: 15). Furthermore, this na­
tionality and the feeling of identity attached to it is not something which is liberally 
chosen (as an individual act of free will), but determined by one’s birth into a given 
cultural community and the accompanying processes of socialisation. This takes 
place particularly in those circles of culture, which regard a nation not as a political 
community in terms of history -  a community made up of free citizens -  but rather 
perceive themselves through race and anthropology: specific race potential, blood 
links, endogenous inheritance and exceptional duty to retain one’s identity. Nations 
perceived in this way are not groups based on free-will, which anyone can pene- 
trate on the strength of choice. It is also far from easy -  as millions of emigrants 
have already painfully experienced -  to turn down one’s membership of a given 
national community. One may acąuire -  through choice -  citizenship, but not na­
tionality.
But there are other complications. As appears to be the case so far, national 
awareness and a feeling of national identity are not only cultural categories but also 
political ones, often described in terms of security, or even state existence itself. 
They are part of politics, as they imply a differentiation between what is one’s own 
and what is alien, friends and foes. Politics determine, as claimed by not only Carl 
Schmitt (1927), what is friend and enemy, but also (Herbert Marcuse) animosity 
(see Ryszka 1975: 148).
Stereotypes of the enemy in national awareness most often are not of 
a concrete historical naturę. They are generał and in this form they are inherited -  
together with linguistic phrases, folk stories and works of superior culture. Franci­
szek Ryszka (1975: 148), commenting C. Schmitt, has this to say: “an enemy is 
someone who is different, an alien. In its particularly intense form an enemy is 
a source of existential conflict, which cannot be subordinated to any generał norm 
or solved through arbitration on the part of an independent third party (...). It is not 
important where the animosity comes from or what its source is. What is important, 
however, is the actual presence of the enemy, that he exists, even though tomorrow 
he may be a friend”. Feelings of animosity, much the same as war, according to the 
maxim ascribed to C. Atlee (1941-1945), “are bom in the minds of men”. But not 
only in the sense of passionate fear of uncertainty, the unknown or violence, but 
also under the influence of state, ideological and religious indoctrination. And sin­
ce this is the case that means that the above is the result of conscious action, which 
can and ought to be rectified.
National awareness, understood as something created subjectively, as well 
as being a purposefully formed conviction of human groupings on being a nation 
(the will to be a nation, “a nation as great solidarity” -  Ernest Renan 1882; human 
groupings became nations because “they became aware of their nationality” -  Bar- 
ker 1933: 219), expressed in terms of wanting to possess one’s own state (one na­
tion in one state -  amongst others, Giuseppe Mazzini and his principle on nationa­
lity; also Gellner’s principle referring to the congruence of state and culture, 
claiming that “a state becomes identified with a certain culture, with a certain style 
of communication, which prevails within its frontiers and which cannot cope wi- 
thout a compact educational system,” 1991: 58 and 167) is in effect a syndrome of 
cognitive and emotional elements, which mutually condition themselves.
These, in my opinion, are as follows: 1) recognition o f  a given territory 
(held presently or in the past, defined as patrimony, domicile, habitat, as well as 
“land of one’s forefathers”, “heritage” and “the promised land”) as the spatial con- 
fines o f one’s own community, in which the community has the right to “feel at 
home”, 2) ethnic myth (in the genealogical sense, professing descent from one 
common ancestor, and in the race sense, “where a named ancestor is replaced by 
a crowd of unnamed ancestors”, Ossowski 1966: 118) expanding the feeling o f  
community -  on the basis of belief in one’s common decent -  beyond the group of 
true kinship (see W eber’s concept of ethnic groups, 1956), 3) conviction o f  com­
mon cultural heritage (including, amongst others, language and often “one’s own” 
religion, customs and practices) and common historical experience, 4) perceiving 
certain psycho-physical traits as peculiar to oneself and one ’s community (stereo- 
type opinions of one’s own group and alien groups, statements on national charac- 
ter; Kubiak 1994), 5) state feelings (a desire to have one’s own state, protection of 
one’s sovereignty, retention and development of one’s culture) and 6) positive f e ­
elings about belonging to a given national-state community, together with as- 
sessment of other communities (“we” and “they”, “ours” and “theirs”), as well as, 
frequently, a conviction of one’s nation’s specific historical mission (Pan-Slavistic 
and Pan-Germanic ideologies, different versions of Messianism, but also doctrines 
such as America’s manifest destiny), justifying comportment towards others.
None of these traits is invariable, as pointed out by theoretical analyses 
(S. Ossowski, E.K. Francis), and empirical research (e.g. W. Markiewicz 1960, 
J. Rokicki 1992, T. Paleczny 1992). Furthermore, there are no good reasons to 
presume that basie functions of national awareness (particularly of an integrating 
and motivational naturę) can be fulfilled exclusively when meanings contained in 
awareness are simplified, and even more so when they are falsified.
First Measures
It was at a relatively early stage that people perceived the possibility of rectifying 
the process of standardising social imagination where it manifested itself most 
commonly: the school and school textbooks. It was a lot later that it was noted in 
symbolical culture, particularly in literature and film, not to mention TV. From the 
beginning measures aimed in this direction were connected with attempts at rele- 
asing international relations from the effects of stereotype opinions, generated by 
ethnocentrism, engendering animosity, and accepting violence as one of the reco- 
gnised forms of national policy.
The first to indicate the need to rectify school textbooks were national (the 
New York Peace Society -  in existence sińce 1815, the English Peace Society -  
founded in 1816 and, five years later, the French Societe de la Morale Chretienne) 
and international (following the conferences of London [1843], Brussels [1848], 
Paris [1849] and after the emergence of the League of Peace and Freedom in Ge- 
neva in 1867) pacifist organisations. The world determined through aggression and 
war was to be replaced by an international order of perpetual peace, not necessarily 
understood in keeping with the programme of Immanuel Kant Zum ewigen Frieden 
(Żelazny 1992). The road towards the desired state of affairs ought to commence -  
in keeping with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberalism and the morał premise of 
a part of Protestant belief -  with rectification of the human mind. Internal order of 
the individual was to lead to the freeing of interpersonal and international relations 
from the use of physical force.
It is notable that the 19lh century ąuest of pacifist movements coincided in 
time with the spreading of education and the broadening of school duties, imposed 
by the state on the legał guardians of children and adolescents. Both these proces- 
ses, however, were asymmetric in naturę. States, by controlling the learning pro­
cess, or even by imposing a monopoly on learning, were consciously erecting bar- 
riers between nations. Pacifist movements -  on the contrary -  expounded universal 
values. The local national and state perspective, and the universal one found them- 
selves in elear conflict. Initially the state was the winner.
Obligatory learning -  starting at a given age and for a specific number of 
years with specific scope -  was first introduced in Prussia (1825). Similar regula- 
tions were soon to follow in Austro-Hungary (1869), Japan (1872) and Great Bri- 
tain (1876). In the United States, as a result of its federal character, obligatory 
schooling was introduced progressively between 1856 and 1918. In Poland, despite 
the fact that the Public Education Chamber had made attempts as early as 1808, 
obligatory schooling was introduced only after the regaining of independence (in 
1919, ratified by an Act of Parliament in 1932).
The family is bound to submit its child to the “education machinę”. A tea- 
cher becomes a state agent, penetrating, at least theoretically “down to the hum- 
blest inhabitant of the least of its villages” (Hobsbawm 1991: 81). At the same time 
the developed educational structure becomes so expensive that only the state can
maintain it. The state becomes its main inspector. As Gellner claims: “Even in 
countries where fragments of the education machinę are in private hands or mana- 
ged by religious unions, the state Controls product ąuality of this presently most 
important industry -  the manufacture of useful creatures, capable of living in so- 
ciety” (Gellnerl991: 51). The spreading by the school system of pattems of culture 
and personality models, of the “national” language and of a system of values, not 
only confirm and spread the social order, but also become an “indispensable me- 
chanism”, “life-giving blood” and the “minimum climate in which members of 
society may breathe, continue and produce” (Gellnerl991: 51). The school system, 
however, not only disseminates the culture of writing, the reception of which requ- 
ires training. It also acts as its co-author, sińce “some minor, local, differentiated 
tradition of illiterate persons” (Gellner 1991: 51) is not enough for a collection of 
local and regional communities to feel it is a supra-regional community, a national 
community, able to act in accordance with the interests of a centralised nation- 
state. School s not only spread information which can be checked (through logie 
and the empirical approach). They also popularise myths, which protect them by 
this virtue from rational criticism. And this leads us very close to the situation whe­
re the light-hearted calling into ąuestion of myths is eąuated to “sacrilege”, 
“arrogance”, the “trampling of tradition” and “high treason”.
After the First World War -  something which was not deprived of its influ- 
ences and effects -  contemplation of the contents of school textbooks led to gradu- 
al institutionalisation. Now the problem of textbooks was in the hands of intema- 
tional organisations: the League of Nations and its International Committee on 
Scientific Cooperation (sińce 1928) and the Special Committee on Morał Disar- 
mament (sińce 1932). Furthermore, there were international research associations 
(e.g. of historians), groups of intellectuals in a variety of countries (The Committee 
on International Intellectual Cooperation in Poland) and denominational organisa­
tions.
The League of Nations international convention on “morał disarmament” 
(Desarmement morał) prepared on Polish initiati ve in 1934 states in articles 1 and 2 
that “school textbooks ought to be prepared in the spirit of respect for nations, un- 
derlining their mutual dependence, which is indispensable in the light of intematio- 
nal cooperation” (Simonides 1980: 160). The Congress of Historians (Oslo 1928) 
considered the Report on nationalism in school textbooks. Similar subject areas 
were discussed at congresses held in the Hague and Basie. The Sub-committee on 
Foreign Textbook Research (part of the Committee on International Intellectual 
Cooperation in Poland) carried out, in 1933, empirical analyses on 200 history and 
geography textbooks from 25 countries belonging to the League of Nations (a more 
detailed account is offered by Gellas 1965 and 1975).
Furthermore, in the inter-war period it was noted (amongst others by Na- 
than Soderblom, the Primate of Sweden, and 1930 Nobel Peace Prize winner) that 
for similar reasons as in the case of school textbooks, it is necessary to subject ide- 
as disseminated by the catechism (Haberman 1972) to close scrutiny.
Dating back to the late 1920s and early 1930s one also notes the first at­
tempts to employ the reassessment of school textbooks for summary political pur- 
poses. This undoubtedly was the case when the Polish government submitted 
a memorandum to the League of Nations on 23 August 1931, as well as a paper 
containing the results of analyses carried out by the Sub-committee on Foreign 
Textbook Research, which was given to the Germans in 1933. Striving to create 
a system of international security, capable of halting action on the part of mass 
media and educational institutions standing in breach of ideas encompassed by the 
League of Nations, Poland not only had in mind the common interests of the inter­
national community, but also -  frankly speaking -  took steps to protect itself from 
anti-Polish propaganda spread by the Germany of that time.
After the Second World War the contents of school textbooks once again 
came under the magnifying glass of international organisations, governments, in- 
tellectual circles and social movements. There were many reasons for this. (1) Im- 
mediately after the war, much the same as in the case of the previous one, there 
was a strong readiness to counter everything concerning matters already known 
from past experience, which fostered feelings of animosity and favoured micro- 
and macro-structural aggression. In this spirit the basie documents of the UNO and 
its specialist agencies, in particular UNESCO, were drawn up. The founding act of 
this organisation states, amongst others, that sińce “war is born in the mind of 
man”, then it should be “overcome in the mind of man”. (2) In this period practical 
reąuirements were clearly stated. The victorious powers included the reassessment 
of textbooks in their de-Nazification programme. Having defeated the German 
armies in battle, the Allies also wished to eliminate Fascism from the German edu­
cational system. Demolishing the institutions of the totalitarian state was not 
enough to give birth to a democratic Germany. It was necessary to defeat the edu­
cational system favouring the emergence of authoritarian characters, legitimising 
this type of state. (3) Not long after, a self-contained stimulus inereasing interest in 
textbooks was the growing war of ideologies between Western society and the 
Soviet answer to solving social conflicts through state socialism. The Cold War 
brought about deeply polarised images of the enemy, as well as -  particularly in 
peace movements -  sharp opposition (including intellectual!) to “barricade” men- 
tality. (4) The left which took over the countries which found themselves in the 
post-war period under Soviet ideological and military domination, treated the break 
in the transfer of culture as an integral part of its own social liberation programme. 
And at the same time it regarded it as a necessary condition in the forging of a new 
brotherhood, the “community of socialist states”. (5) After the political changes 
brought about by the Autumn of Nations of 1989, in this part of Europę (though not 
in each of these countries to the same degree) textbooks were once again reasses- 
sed. This time the purpose was de-communisation, the vanquishing of ideological 
influences brought about by Marxism and Leninism and the elimination of educa­
tional models generated by this ideology -  models such as homo sovieticus, defined 
by Alexandr Zinovyev (1984; see also Tischner 1992). The so-called “white stains” 
were now a problem area. (6) The need for fundamental changes in school textbo-
oks was proclaimed by a variety of church denominations in Central and Eastem 
Europę which saw change as an important factor in the religious revival of “post- 
communist societies”. (7) The stipulation to reassess the contents of textbooks was 
included at a relatively early stage in bi-lateral meetings and agreements, which 
were later signed. In some cases preparatory work was carried out by non- 
govemment organisations (e.g. UNESCO national committees). This was the case 
of Franco-German negotiations held in the 1950s and Polish-German meetings of 
the 1970s. In many cases textbook clauses (referring to the need to overcome pre- 
judices and stereotypical opinions in school textbooks) were included in the bi- 
lateral treaties (e.g. the Polish-West German treaty of 1970). (8) The ever-stronger 
socio-political integration of Western Europę generated its own need for this kind 
of reassessment. Changes in textbook contents, in this case, were looked upon as 
not only as an instrument of integration but also as an indicator of integration. 
A common history, free of all manner of chauvinist stereotypes, teaching multi- 
dimensional understanding of the process of history and encouraging the removal 
of the causes of conflict, was to become an important ingredient at the base of 
a common Europę. And finally (9) - the reassessment of textbooks and, in this case, 
of catechisms as well (and of other texts with similar functions) brought about 
ecumenical tendencies within Christianity -  first of all amongst faiths constituting 
the World Council of Churches, then between Catholicism, Protestantism and the 
Orthodox Church, and finally between all monotheistic religions. These tendencies 
mainly concentrated on the search for a new paradigm in the theology of dialogue 
(D’Arcy May 1988:573) and in re-interpreting texts, which might uphold mutual 
prejudices, including anti-Semitism (Reinhartz 1988: 524).
As it appears from the above review, the stipulation to reassess textbooks does 
not always have to signify generał interest prevailing over the private needs of specific 
social movements and organisations. This does not concem points three, four and six, 
sińce inspired changes do not reąuire the elimination of simplifications and falsity, but 
only serve the purpose of replacing the indoctrinating code. The vision of the world 
appropriate for the losing ideologies is replaced, generally speaking, by an eąually one- 
sided victorious ideology, capitalizing its triumph by taking control of the process of 
leaming. The fact of manipulation itself does not undergo change. The only thing that 
changes is the manipulator. For this reason I exclude this type of reassessment of text- 
books from further analysis. I shall concentrate above all on those attempts at changing 
textbook contents, which were aimed at tuming them into textbooks helping to under- 
stand the complexity of the process of history and, at the sane time, of forging an un­
derstanding between nations.
The School Textbook
Focus on school textbooks by no means signifies depreciation of other factors con- 
ditioning the essence and function of national awareness, in particular symbolical 
culture, language, religion, institutions (including the family and neighbours) and
the importance of individual auto-reflection. Of course, national awareness is ulti- 
mately the function of many causes mutually conditioning themselves. In this con- 
text the school textbook plays an exceptional role. From a common-sense point of 
view it is a systematised collection of factual information (pertaining to people, 
events and processes), a number of methodological directives and bibliographical 
indications, which prepare the pupil for independent analysis and interpretation of 
a chosen fragment of reality. In essence it is something more: an important tool of 
ideological and political indoctrination. It not only teaches how to interpret, it not 
only informs about objective (if such a thing exists) criteria of assessment, but also 
spreads binding evaluations. It not only demonstrates personal models (of “ours” 
and “theirs”), but at the same time “prompts”, which of these models ought to be 
chosen. Furthermore, these formulae for interpretation, these assessments and im­
posed personal models are -  and not only in the case of the so-called catechismal 
model -  duplicated over and over again, with a pupil’s school marks depending on 
the degree to which he has retained them. They are handed over to recipients who- 
se personalities, in consideration of their age, are easily moulded. This handing 
down is enveloped by an aura of spreading the truth, which is generated by the 
school itself. On this basis the teaching of history, aesthetics, literature and socio- 
political norms becomes (or at least this is the intention!) as obvious as the axioms 
of mathematics, the laws of physics, chemical compounds or the principles of bio- 
logy. What more, textbooks refer to information, images and emotions of a pre- 
(e.g. folk tales and songs, tales handed down by family members) and an extra- 
school naturę (the press, radio, TV, current opinion). Some of the above is retained, 
the rest is repulsed by the memory. It is worth noting that for many people school 
textbooks were and remain the only books read in entirety. Furthermore, they were 
the only books available at home.
I believe that textbooks on history, the national literature, civic education 
and religion do not preach cognitive and emotional distance towards their contents. 
They do not offer preparation towards accepting the truth, they do not inform about 
the alternatives, but rather portray a polarised image of history and culture. They 
tend to prepare towards participation, as Stanisław Ossowski said, in the myth of 
our ancestors, in the heroism of our “fathers and grandfathers”. The explication is 
simplification. A half-truth, providing it helps to “fortify one’s heart” and maintain 
a tradition, is readily justified. “Ours” is more important than “theirs”. Truth is 
replaced by a stereotype, with elear, unequivocal images, emotionally intact and 
reflecting earlier impressions and judgements, being easier to remember. This is 
followed by what is only too well known to psychologists -  wishful thinking.
Franciszek Ryszka (1994: 1) is correct when he states that “the thicker the 
contours, the easier they are to retain in one’s memory and imagination. Imagina- 
tion, in tum, stimulates our feelings” -  both friendly and unfriendly. “The latter, 
however, seems to prevail, particularly in those cases where the stereotype has 
political functions”. Furthermore -  and this is borne out by international compara- 
tive research completed in 1995 on memories of the Second World War in six 
Central and East European countries -  people most quickly forget facts and histori-
cal figures of a given period, but most often retain in their memories globalise -  
emotionally as well -  images of events, particularly if for a protracted period of 
time they are intensively popularised (see research results of the Social Opinion 
Research Institute IMAS International 1995 and Holzer 1995: 19). A similar thing 
happens when we have a generał stereotype of the enemy, a conviction, for exam- 
ple, that Germans are criminals, “all Germans, their entire nation”, “Germans in 
generał”, or on the same basis, “Russians in generał”.
This problem, however, is far wider and cannot be exhausted by simply 
asking the ąuestion how (and why) should nations perceive themselves. This pro­
blem also includes textbook-based standardised impressions about social roles e.g. 
of men and women and how they should prepare themselves for these roles, of 
groups and of social categories. Accurate perceptions on the standardisation of 
impressions on social roles are to be found in the 1995 non-government Report on 
the standing of women in Poland. The Report states, amongst others, that in Polish 
schools textbooks still prevail which support the idea of the “patriarchal image of 
the family and the world” . “Women in these textbooks are portrayed mainly as 
mothers and housewives”. “The textbook mum most often does not work pro- 
fessionally, she has no friends or acquaintances, she has no interests, and practi- 
cally does not function outside the home”. “The figurę of the father is sketched far 
more attractively, ‘festively’ (illustrations depict him wearing a tie). He talks about 
interesting events, he knows a lot about technology, he reads a lot, he meets 
friends, has hobbies, he is the initiator of many family attractions” (Report 1995: 
54, 55). The second problem, referring to the stereotyping of social categories, in 
recent times has been well-illustrated by e.g. American discussions, inspired by the 
National Centre on the Teaching of History, which consider the so-called “national 
history standards of the United States”. These discussions propose limiting the 
showing of white men and changing the time dedicated in portraying specific figu­
res, events and processes, in order to talk about the history of the States from the 
perspective of the disadvantaged minorities: the Indians, Afro-Americans and wo­
men.
But why is it so difficult, despite the rationality of the argumentation, to 
alter the present state of affairs? This is for at least three reasons. First of all, the 
problem is connected with resistance on the part of the state. I shall illustrate this 
by giving the example of Ienaga Saburo’s thirty-year battle with the Ministry of 
Education. I shall explain the second reason, based on ideological and political 
premises, by analysing the dispute on the image of national culture and the canon 
of school textbooks in the Poland of today. The third reason is connected with the 
specific character of the historical process.
As far as state resistance is concemed, generally speaking, obligatory 
school textbooks correspond with an eąually binding (not only formally!) vision of 
reasons of State and national pride: a state should not admit guilt and a nation 
should not apologise to anyone. But most often this is necessary. As Tadahide Hi- 
rokawa (1995: 12-13) recently stated, the history textbook of Ienaga Saburo was 
not approved and allowed at school, because it gave an objective account of,
amongst others, the massacre in Nankin and of “Japanese aggression in Asia”. In- 
stead of the phrase “Japanese aggression in Asia” the Ministry of Education would 
have preferred “the entry of the Japanese army”. Ienaga Saburo says that 
“Immediately after occupying Nankin the Japanese army murdered many Chinese 
soldiers and civilians” . The Ministry would have preferred the following: “In the 
generał confusion, which took place after the occupation of Nankin by the Japanese 
army, many Chinese soldiers and civilians died”. Other fragments of Saburo’s 
textbook, including those referring to experiments with bacteriological weapons 
carried out in Harbin by the Japanese 731 detachment, in the opinion of the Mini­
stry, ought to be removed altogether. According to the Japanese social movement 
“Save from Oblivion”, which supports the reassessment of history textbooks, the 
past should not be justified but attempts should be made to comprehend it. Memory 
of the war crime committed Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot replace memory of 
Japanese crimes in occupied countries. And vice versa.
Ideological and political assumptions, conspicuous in the programmes of 
the majority of today’s right-wing parties in Poland, also manifest a drive towards 
changes in the contents of textbooks (providing that change can facilitate a return 
to the status quo ante bellutń), as well as retaining their present form (if assessment 
“under European pressure” were to lead to a reassessment of that which “survived 
the pressure of Communism”). The desired state, something which transpires, 
amongst others, from the May 1995 issue of the national-radical monthly 
“Szczerbiec”, is determined by values: the Altar, the Absolute, Truth, Tradition, 
Order, the Family, the Fatherland, the Nation, Possession and Race (“Polityka” 
1995 no. 21: 14). The above is threatened, according to supporters of this orienta- 
tion not only by “post-Communist legacy”, but also by the “pressure of Western 
mass culture”. Bad culture ousts good culture, and violence, pornography and bla- 
sphemy prevail over values” . Mirosław Pęczak (1995: 17), having reviewed the 
columns o f “Gazeta Polska”, “Ład”, “Najwyższy Czas” and “Arka”, comes to the 
conclusion that the cultural programme of Poland’s right wing contains, above all, 
the following slogans: “more of Poland”, “save the family”, “parents are more im­
portant than the child, and men are more important than women”, “return to strict 
morał values”, “fundamental truths”, “homeliness”. Fulfilment of the right wing’s 
vision of culture is impeded by “gnosticism”, ecological pantheism, universalism, 
multi-culturality”, “liberalism in culture”, “pluralism of falsity on TV and radio” 
and attempts at shifting to Poland American “political correctness”, supported by 
“uprooted intellectuals”. The latter of these are more concemed with fostering 
“sexual minorities than bringing up their own children; they do not believe in God 
and they care nothing for the family”. For this reason it is necessary to engage in 
“group action reminiscent of the Jesuits of the 16th century” and to attain state po- 
wer in order to use it for the purpose of effecting “spiritual aims” . “Healthy and 
patriotic censorship” may tum out to be indispensable. Under its influence there 
might appear “some kind of school reading-list canon, maybe without works of 
Żeromski, but with Hubert Rostworowski. With Herbert; but Miłosz might have
some problems (...) Wherever you look -  many references to the past, including the 
period o f at least fifty years ago” (Pęczak 1995: 17).
The last of the three mentioned problem areas refers to specifics, or rather: 
the conflictive naturę of the historical process and the dependence of human per- 
ception of the world on historical experiences, group interests and the system of 
values. “Polish military triumphs,” as Janusz Tazbir wrote in 1992, “shall always 
figurę in history textbooks of the defeated states as calamities”. This is undoubte- 
dly true but only under certain circumstances of history being perceived in a pecu- 
liar manner: history as revenge according to binding models reaching up to the end 
of the 19th century amongst Corsican and Sicilian peasants, or peculiar to certain 
contemporary Mafia groupings. This state of affairs must constantly bread animo­
sity. But today’s Scandinavian nations are free of mutual animosity, though their 
past was not free of armed conflict. The important thing here is not the past itself, 
but the way in which we rationalise it.
Anna Wolff-Powęska, in her article written in 1995, comments Polish- 
German relations after World War Two. She points out the rather obvious fact that 
the worst recipe for the past is one-sided interpretation. This was so in the case of 
forced resettlement, when the “vociferous rhetoric of resettlement organisations” in 
the German Federal Republic was accompanied by “an omission to disclose the fuli 
truth” by the Poland of that time “in fear of placing one’s own martyrology in 
a relative context”. But, as is known today, the situation could well have been 
different. The establishment of recommendation no. 22 of the UNESCO Polish 
People’s Republic/German Federal Republic Committee on School Textbooks 
(refers to Potsdam documents employing the “transfer of people” expression) 
which would permit avoiding the division into “victors” and “vanquished”, because 
“it was the truth that really mattered” (Markiewicz 1986: 11) tumed out to be 
a viable solution. The necessary truth of “forgive, but not forget” was attained.
We come across similar problems when dealing with many historical figu- 
res and dates. Take as an example Władysław Jagiełło, a Lithuanian and the king of 
Poland, who becomes the victor at the Battle of Grunwald. He is a symbolical figu­
rę in the Polish pantheon, but at the tum of the 19th century Lithuania branded him 
a “collaborator and traitor”. It is easy to find other examples in Polish-German, 
Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukranian relations of figures who are perceived in radi- 
cally different ways. But even here -  once we treat history as the “teacher of sense 
and not of principles” (Edmund Burkę), once the textbook ceases to be a legacy of 
animosity and embarks on the road of understanding the circumstances which 
brought about hatred -  will it be possible to find generally acceptable solutions.
Now it is time to mention the Mannheim motif. There is no doubt that this 
historical fact may be interpreted differently by Poles, Americans, Germans, Rus- 
sians or the French. Apart from obvious deviations from the norm this does not 
occur through anyone’s ill-will. People simply express “what they see, what they 
feel, what they comprehend”, which is the result of their different culture and diffe­
rent location on the political and economic map of the world. It is these elements 
which endow one’s experiences with specific meaning. The same, globally spe-
aking, events are e.g in the historiography of different nations dated in different 
ways, as for example the Second World War. For China it started in September 
1931 with the Japanese aggression on Manchuria, for Czechoslovakia in September 
1938 (the Munich Agreement, giving the Third Reich the right to occupy and an- 
nex large territories of the Czechoslovak Republic), for Poland in 1939, for the 
USSR in June 1941, for the USA in December 1941 following the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor. If, however, “the fate of the world depends on the race between 
the process of education and catastrophe” (Kennedy 1992), then this difficulty must 
also be overcome in the same manner as in the Mannheim recipe for overcoming 
the destructive influence of ideology through self-knowledge.
For this and other reasons it is still easier to write a common textbook than 
to introduce it into the school systems of a given group of countries. An example of 
this may be the three-volumed European Inheritance (1955) edited by E. Barker, 
G. Clark and P. Vaucher, which came into being as a “Comprehensive and inde­
pendent history for pupils and students throughout the continent”. Work on this 
textbook, inspired by nine states in the anti-Hitler coalition, was started in London 
in 1943. The results of this work were published twelve years later. But the textbo- 
ok was not introduced into schools in the 1950s or at any time later. Will the same 
fate meet the 1992 (380-page long) common history textbook of the 12 European 
Community countries?
A common vision of history can still hurt the pride of many nations, 
formed on the basis of old models. It is still easier to engage in polemics on his­
tory’ s great figures (Charlemagne, Copernicus), which symbolise in themselves the 
greatness of specific nations. One may keep disagreeing that the French Char­
lemagne is, at the same time, Karl der Grosse, and that Copernicus is the “common 
heritage of Poles, Germans and Europeans” (Helmut Kohl in a speech given in the 
Bundestag on 1 June 1995). It is simpler to maintain stereotype views e.g. of “the 
Kacap” and “the Polack” (Yerofyeyev 1995) and auto-stereotype opinions e.g. of 
the Slovaks being more talented and better educated “than the European average, 
which surrounds them. Those who think otherwise are the enemy” (Strasser 1995), 
than to admit that no nation can boast being the depository of specific genetic pre- 
dispositions and that no nation has an exceptional mission in the history of humanity.
The Desired Status
Władysław Markiewicz (1986: 130 is undoubtedly right when he says that “The 
authentic and permanent reconstruction of awareness and mutual attitudes of na­
tions to one another, particularly those which have experienced mutual age-long 
animosity or even hatred, certainly cannot be attained over one generation”. This 
status cannot be reached exclusively by means of scientific historiography, which 
“to a far lesser degree influences historical imagination than literary fiction, pain- 
ting and musie”, or without taking into account the educational ambience of the 
family home. However, the beginnings of the required changes are actually linked
to historiography and -  as may be positively verified -  by the findings of the Fran- 
co-German textbook committee (in existence sińce 1950) or, twenty years later, the 
Polish-German Joint Textbook Committee. Maybe it is also necessary to start from 
historiography because it is simpler to come to a common agreement on how to 
perceive the historical process than to limit the negative socialising effects of eth- 
nocentrism, manifest in so many areas of symbolical culture.
An analytical review of works published by international institutes (prima- 
rily the George Eckert International Textbook Research Institute [MIBP], founded 
on UNESCO initiative in Brunswick in 1951), domestic institutes (e.g. The School 
Programmes Institute of the Ministry of Education and Upbringing or the Western 
Institute in Poznań), specialist magazines (e.g.: “Kwartalnik Historyczny”, “Wia­
domości Historyczne”, “Dzieje Najnowsze”, “Westermanns Padagogische Beitrage”, 
“International Journal of Political Education” and the “Journal of Peace Research”), 
compact works (those published in recent years, in particular works of Anna 
Wolff-Powęska [1993], Friedbert Pflueger, Winfried Lipscher and Jerzy Holzer 
[1994]) and published thoughts of members of joint textbook committees (e.g. 
Karl-Ernest Jeismann, former director of the MIBP in Brunswick [1994]) allows 
one to draw a number of generał conclusions concerning preliminary conditions of 
“comprehension textbooks” (the term was coined by Jan M. Piskorski [1992]).
(1)Thorough work on a common textbook requires an “undertaking on the part of 
the intelligent individual to look for the truth, to be sapped of all prejudices”. This 
need to embark on a quest and to have a truth link (“intemal reasons of State of 
a learned community”) must be “stronger than the image of the enemy fossilised 
through afflictions of the past”, there must be a “drive to create a European peace 
order in the futurę” which shall outweigh 19th century and contemporary nationa- 
lism (Jeismann 1994: 114). This is a matter of finding the will and skill to search 
for the truth in the face of obstacles: we must draw a line between what we have 
trusted so far, cali into question that which we have unreservedly believed in -  on 
the strength of historical patency -  and query stereotypes and auto-stereotypes of 
“collective suggestions, which already beset our childhood and construct the image 
of our nation against the backdrop of our enemy”. This, at last, is a discursive 
change of the “symbolical worlds of concepts which our nations inhabit” (Jeismann 
1994: 114, 115).
(2) At the outset the indispensable “scientific rationality in a closed circle” ought 
to, with time, transform into a “public debate on the inherited imaginations of one- 
se lf’, only to end with “a melting down of mind and heart barriers, which stand in 
the way of practical common-sense and consideration in the expression of judge- 
ments”. Without public dispute, the quest for a common sense of history may 
easily become “degraded to the level of textbook diplomacy”, or even “mani- 
pulation for political ends and, specifically, of institutions which give money” (Je­
ismann 1994: 115).
(3)Gradually, by availing ourselves of the knowledge of historians and geogra- 
phers, the whole of symbolical culture ought to appear before us, in particular the 
impressions and models diffused by the canon of obligatory school-books. This
canon, according to opinions expressed at the Polonists Convention (May 1995), 
cannot be a “gigantic supermarket”, nor a collection of texts spreading the notion 
of “jingoistic martyrdom”, which pushes the young Polish reader into a “strange 
Polish niche”, or even worse, onto the “brink of nationalism”, with “Polishness” 
being the enemy of “Europeanism” (Sosnowski 1995). Others ways of preparing 
pupils to react to literature -  that golden medium between revolutionary changes 
threatening a “loss of memory, identity, and temptation towards anarchy” and 
a discontinuation in the inter-generation transfer process, and the temptation to 
remain in the “trenches of the Holy Trinity” -  are far from simple. But despite this 
they are necessary. Analysis of historical transfer ought to be expanded to include 
literary texts. This is because information and historical assessments constitute an 
element of the worldview only after they have been processed by literature -  litera­
ry short-cuts, personal figure-models and iconography.
(4)Those in leaming ought to be given the possibility of understanding national 
idiosyncrasies, “national divergence in perceiving the truth”. They ought to be 
helped to see the multi-dimensionality of reality, to understand this reality simulta- 
neously from the point of view of many national-state communities, and through 
the prism of the universal code of human rights. For this reason the components 
necessary for contemporary civilizational competence are as follows: empathy, 
compliance with multi-model human fulfilment, dialogue skills, and the blocking 
of one’s own aggression. No national community has a monopoly on evil or a pa­
tent for what is good. Not only the great are responsible for the process of history 
but also the “fellow travellers” (Mitlaufer).
(5) Since we cannot run away from the past we should not forget about it. The past, 
the complexity of conditions, which led to events, must be understood. We must 
understand the past, not in order to justify it, but to free ourselves of its burden in 
the educational system and in politics: we must expand social imagination, be able 
to foresee tomorrow’s effects and today’s actions. “Collective blame does not exist, 
but rather joint responsibility for conclusions” drawn on the basis of historical 
experience. The way in which “responsibility for the past is accepted or rejected by 
sovereign and democratic states is decided by their political culture and new natio­
nal identity” (Wolff-Powęska 1995: 7).
(6)Textbooks of agreement ought to prepare one for accepting the truth, for lo- 
oking at history impartially, and not for sąuaring it up in a resentful, martyrologi- 
cal, self-vindictive or heroic manner. Falsehood, much the same as wishful thin- 
king, clouds the issue.
(7) Since national awareness is the resultant of many causes and processes which 
interfere with one another (both planned and natural), it is wrong to presume that 
the introduction of common textbooks (or just a reassessment of national textbooks 
in keeping with bi-lateral agreements) shall automatically bring the desired results. 
For this reason the state of social awareness ought to be systematically and tho- 
roughly monitored, with the results being made generałly available.
(8)The political system which most fully permits conflict-free disclosure of diffe- 
rences appears to be consociational democracy (Lijphart 1997), regarded by many 
as a new form of political and cultural organizing of post-national societies.
Everything that has been stated above does not mean that sińce it is already 
known that: 1) national awareness is to a large degree the product of standardi- 
sation and that 2) textbooks free of ethnocentrism may serve international under- 
standing and assist in the formation of multi-tiered identities (local-religious, na- 
tional-state, Continental), then by this virtue the problem has finally been solved. 
Of course, preparations towards a peaceful existence in a united Europę through 
e.g. a reassessment of school textbook contents and social re-education, is possible. 
However, this cannot be effected equally well in every situation. Undoubtedly 
a negative effect would be brought about by anxiety, fear about the futurę and mass 
poverty. States of existential threat increase the need for a polarised, simple and 
conclusive explanation in old ethnocentric categories, rather than the now de- 
manded understanding beyond divisions. For this reason it is worth recalling the 
wise caution of Karl-Emst Jeismann (1994: 119): “No pedagogics, no teaching can 
awaken commitment in the name of understanding between nations if living pros- 
pects are deplorable, if schools and education remain on the margin”.
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